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ABSTRACT
Supplier has many schemes to motivate retailer to buy more and of them one is a progressive permissible 
delay of payment. Instead of analyst from the retailer side alone, in this chapter, we develop the inven-
tory model of supplier and retailer. In reality, some suppliers and retailers cannot have collaboration 
and they try to optimize their own decision so we develop a Stackelberg Game model. Two models are 
developed wherein the first model supplier acts as the leader and in the second model, the retailer acts a 
leader. Since the models are complex, a hybrid Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Particle Swarm Optimization 
(PSO) is developed to solve the model. A numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis are conducted to 
get management insights of the model. The results show that a Stackelberg Game model for progressive 
permissible delay of payment is sensitive in varies values of the first and second delay interest rate if 
supplier acts as a leader. The retailer gets less inventory cost when he acts as a leader compared to 
when vendor acts a leader at high interest rate of the first and second delay period.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to motivate customers to buy more from supplier, supplier apply some scheme such as dynamic 
pricing, quantity discount gift on purchase and permissible delay of payments. Trade credit in the form of 
permissible delay of payment affects the conduct of business significantly (Jaggi et al., 2013). In permis-
sible delay of payment buyer does not have to pay the supplier immediately after receiving the goods but 
can delay the payment until the allowable time period. Buyer can get benefit from interest earn form goods 
that have been sold. Many research have been conducted by considering permissible delay of payment 
in inventory. Huang (2005) developed a buyer’s inventory model by considering delay of payment and 
cash discount. Inventory model with collaboration between supplier and retailer by considering permis-
sible delay of payment was developed by Jaber and Osman (2006). They concluded that coordination 
with permissible delay in payment is better than no-coordination system. Similar research of inventory 
model with permissible delay of payment under collaboration between single-vendor and single-buyer 
for deteriorating items was developed by Yang and Wee (2006). They found that permissible delay of 
payment is a win-win strategy when implemented under collaboration system. Liao (2007) developed 
deteriorating economic production quantity model by considering permissible delay in payments. Tsao 
and Sheen (2008) did not consider permissible delay of payment for deteriorating inventory model but 
they also include other schemes which are dynamic pricing and promotion. Instead only collaboration 
between supplier and retailer, Jaggi et al. (2008) developed an inventory model with two levels of credit 
policy. In their model supplier gives a fixed credit period to the retailer and retailer offer credit period 
to customers. Inventory model with permissible delay of payment by considering allowable shortage 
was introduced by Chung and Huang (2009). Huang et al. (2010) developed single-vendor single buyer 
integrated inventory model considering permissible delay of payments and order time reduction that can 
be attained through procedural changes, worker training and specialized equipment acquisition. Sarkar 
(2012) developed an EOQ model by considering stock dependent demand, production defective items 
and delay of payment scheme.
Soni and Shah (2008) develop an inventory model with stock dependent demand and progressive 
payment scheme. Progressive scheme is a variant of permissible delay of payment. In progressive pay-
ments scheme, there is more than one payment period. The supplier does not charge any interest if the 
buyer pays before the first payment period but interest will be charged after the first payment period 
and become higher for the next payment period. Similar payment scheme model using two-levels of 
credit policy was developed by Jaggi et al. (2012). This chapter tries to extend the work of Soni and 
Shah (2008) by considering not only retailers but supplier and retailer decisions simultaneously in just 
in time inventory model. Since supplier and the retailer try to optimize their own decision, the model 
is developed as a non-cooperative model. Single vendor-single buyer non-cooperative models with 
permissible delay in payments are developed using Stackelberg equilibrium (Chern et al., 2013) and 
under Nash equilibrium (Chern et al.,2014). Teng et al. (2012) studied vendor-buyer inventory model 
with credit financing for both integrated and non-cooperative environment. They concluded that vendor 
should offer short permissible delay payment to reduce its cost. Li et al. (2014) introduced an inventory 
model with a transferable utility game under permissible delay of payment scheme. Supplier sells the 
same commodities and gives the retailers delay of payments.
Stackelberg Game can be described as follows: a leader of this game, for example a supplier, who 
knows the decision process of his buyers will react to maximize his own profit. The buyer, as a follower, 
answers the supplier’s decision by setting new decision to improve his profit. On the other side, buyer 
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can act as a leader and supplier acts of the follower depend on the bargaining power of the buyer and 
the supplier. Even though collaboration system is better than the competitive system, Stackelberg game 
theory has attracted many researchers’ attention for practical reason. Esmaeili et al. (2008) developed 
Stackelberg game and cooperative game between several buyers and several sellers where marketing 
expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. Yu et 
al. (2009) discussed a Stackelberg Game theory in a Vendor Manage Inventory (VMI) system. They 
concluded that vendor can get benefit from his leadership in Stackelberg game model. In this chapter, 
Stackelberg game model between the supplier and the buyer is developed. Supplier produces an item 
continuously and then sends it to the buyer using just in time concept.
From our extensive literature research there are few papers discussing about inventory models with 
progressive delay of payment scheme and no research that consider two players in progressive delay 
of payment scheme using Stackelberg game approach. In this chapter, supplier will give two period 
permissible delay of payment to the buyer and the buyer decides replenishment period and delivery 
frequency at each replenishment time. The item will send to the buyer in discrete frequency and buyer 
can sell it directly to customer with constant demand rate. Buyer can pay the supplier at the first delay 
period, between first and second delay period and after the second delay period. In this chapter, we will 
show the effect of progressive delay in payment when supplier acts a leader and buyer acts as a leader. 
Since the model is complex, a hybrid of Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Simulate Annealing (SA) is used 
to solve the problem. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the research 
gap and literature study. Inventory model development is shown in section two and the method to solve 
the model is described in section three. Section four shows a numerical example and sensitivity analysis 
to give management insights of the model and section five concluded the results.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The entire of this chapter using assumptions, parameters and decision variables as follows:
Assumptions
1.  Demand rate is constant and deterministic.
2.  Shortage is not allowed
3.  Production rate is higher than demand rate
4.  Delivery lead time is zero
5.  Supplier does not charge any interest if buyer pay before delay period (M1). Supplier charges buyer 
with interest Ic1 if buyer pay between first delay period (M1) and second delay period (M2) and 
interest (Ic2) if the buyer pay after second delay period (M2), where (Ic2 > Ic1).
6.  Planning horizon is infinite.
Parameters
I: Product quantity
Q: Order quantity
q: Delivery quantity
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K: Delivery frequency
w: Delivery frequency during production up time
P: Supplier’s production rate (unit/unit time)
D: Buyer’s demand rate (unit/unit time)
A: Buyer’s ordering cost
Av: Supplier’s setup cost
Ct: Transportation cost
h: Buyer’s inventory cost
ho: Buyer’s opportunity cost
hv: Supplier’s inventory cost
hvo: Supplier’s opportunity cost
IP: Supplier average inventory
Ic1: Supplier’s interest rate for buyer when the buyer pay between M1 and M2 Period
Ic2: Supplier’s interest rate for buyer when the buyer pay after M2 period
Ie: Bank’s interest rate
c: product unit cost
pr: product price
TIev: Total supplier’s opportunity cost
TIeb: Total buyer’s interest profit
TIc1: Total interest paid by the buyer if buyer pays between M1 and M2 period
TIc2: Total interest paid by the buyer if buyer pays after M2 period
TBUC: Buyer’s total cost
TVUC: Supplier’s total cost
Decision Variables
T: Replenishment period
K: Delivery quantity during replenishment period
M1: The first period of delay of payment
M2: The second period of delay of payment
This chapter discusses an inventory model with progressive payment between single supplier and single 
buyer. Supplier has a specific production rate and delivers the buyer’s order in a specific quantity (q) to 
the buyer in a discrete delivery frequency (K) as seen in Figure 1. Buyer receives items from the sup-
plier in a specific T/K period and then sells the items with a constant demand rate. Figure 2 show the 
inventory rate at the buyer’s side. The buyer does not have to pay directly when the items are delivered. 
The supplier gives delay of payment to the buyer to give opportunity for buyer to buy in higher volume. 
Supplier has two deadline payment period which are M1 and M2. When the buyer pay before M1 period, 
there is no interest charged by supplier to the buyer. If the buyer pays after M1 and before M2, supplier 
charges a certain interest rate to the buyer. If the buyer pays after M2 period then the supplier charges 
the buyer with higher interest rate. The buyer can sell the items directly and can get cash payment from 
his customer. The buyer can save his income to banks and get extra interest.
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There are three cases in this model. In the first model, the total order quantity (Q) in replenishment 
time (T) has shorter time than the first delay period (M1). The second case where replenishment time in 
between the first delay period and second delay period and the last case where replenishment period is 
longer than the second delay period.
Using Figure 1, the supplier has production rate P and has production period as long as (wT/K) 
period. Supplier delivers m unit/delivery every T/K period for K deliveries. Average supplier inventory 
can be modeled as:
IP
q
K T
K
wT
K
T
K
q K w
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−



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2
 (1)
Figure 1. Supplier’s inventory model
Figure 2. Buyer inventory level
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and the buyer average inventory as seen in Figure 2, can be modeled as
IB
q
=
2
 (2)
Case 1
(T≤M1) 
In the first case replenishment time (T) is shorter than the first delay time (M1). Buyer can has payment 
at last in the first delay time (M1). When buyer pay at M1, buyer can have opportunity cost as shown in 
Figure 3.
When vendor does not apply for delay of payment, supplier can receive payment directly after the 
products are sold to buyer. Since supplier applied delay of payment, supplier has opportunity cost as below.
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 (3)
In the other side, buyer receives payment directly from his buyer and delay payment to supplier until 
the first delay period (M1). With bank interest rate (Ie), buyer can get total interest gain as:
TI I DT M
T
eb e
= −
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 (4)
The total supplier cost consists of setup cost, inventory cost and opportunity lost cost, and one has:
TVUC
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 (5)
Figure 3. Buyer opportunity cost for case 1
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The buyer cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory cost and buyer’s opportunity 
gain as modeled below.
TBUC
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Case 2
(M1 ≤ T ≤ M2) 
In the case 2, there are two possibilities of buyer opportunity cost as shown in Figure 4. The first case 
occurs when the vendor production uptime longer than the first delay of payment period and the second 
case when the vendor production uptime is shorter than the first delay of payment period.
Case 2.1.
prDM1 + prIeDM12/2 ≥ cDT 
In this case, the buyer can pay with full payment at M1. For this case, there are two cases of the vendor 
opportunity cost. In the first cases, the vendor’s production up time period is less than the first permis-
sible time and in the second case, the vendor’s production period is longer than the first permissible 
payment. For the first case, the vendor opportunity cost is same as equation (3). For the second case, 
the vendor opportunity cost is:
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Since the buyer pays all cost at M1, so the vendor does not get interest earned. The buyer interest 
earned is equal to:
Figure 4. Buyer opportunity cost for case 2
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Buyer does not have interest cost, since buyer pays all payment at M1.
Case 2.1.a.
wT/K < M1 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, interest cost, opportunity cost 
minus interest earned. The total inventory cost per unit can be modeled as:
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The vendor total cost consists of setup cost, physical inventory holding cost, interest cost minus 
interest earned. The vendor total cost is
TVUC
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Case 2.1.b.
wT/K > M1 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, interest cost, opportunity 
cost minus interest earned. The total inventory cost is same as TBUC21a. The vendor total cost consists 
of setup cost, physical inventory holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. The vendor total cost 
can be formulated as:
TVUC
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h q K w h P M
b
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2 2
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Case 2.2.
prDM1 + prIeDM12/2 < cDT 
In this case, the vendor opportunity cost is equal with the vendor opportunity cost in case 2.1. The vendor 
interest earned can be modeled as:
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The buyer interest cost is equal to the vendor interest earned and the buyer interest earned is equal 
to case 2.1.
Case 2.2.a.
wT/K < M1 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, interest cost, opportunity cost 
minus interest earned. The total inventory cost per unit can be modeled as:
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The vendor total cost consists of setup cost, inventory holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. 
The vendor total cost can be formulated as:
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Case 2.2.b.
wT/K > M1 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory cost, interest cost, 
opportunity cost minus interest earned. The total inventory cost is same as TBUC22a. The vendor total 
cost consists of setup cost, inventory holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. The vendor total 
cost can be formulated as:
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Case 3
(M2 ≤ T) 
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There are some possibilities when the replenishment time (T) is longer than the second delay of pay-
ment period (M2). The buyer opportunity cost for case 3 has same trend as case 2 as shown in Figure 4.
Case 3.1.
p DM p I DM cDT
r r e1 1
2 2+ ≥/  
In this case the vendor opportunity cost is equal with the vendor opportunity cost in case 2, the vendor 
interest earned is zero since all payment is paid at M1, The buyer interest cost is zero since all payment 
is paid at M1 and the buyer interest earned is equal to case 2.1. There are two possibilities where produc-
tion period is shorter than the first delay of payment and the production period is longer than the first 
delay of payment.
Case 3.1.a.
wT K M/ <
1
 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory cost, minus interest 
earned. The total inventory is same as TBUC21a. The vendor total cost consists of setup cost, inventory 
holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. The vendor total cost is same as TBUC21a.
Case 3.1.b.
wT/K > M1 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory cost minus interest 
earned. The total buyer inventory cost per unit is same as TBUC21a. The vendor total cost consists of setup 
cost, inventory holding cost, and interest cost. The vendor total cost per unit time is same as TVUC21a.
Case 3.2.
p DM p I DM cDTbut
p D M M
p IeD M M
r r e
r
r
1 1
2 2 1
2 1
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2
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
/
–
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


≥ +

cDTp DM p I DMr r e1 1
2 2 /  
The vendor opportunity cost is equal with the vendor opportunity cost in case 2. The vendor interest 
earned, the buyer interest cost and the buyer interest earned is equal to case 2.2.
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Case 3.2.a.
wT/K < M1 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory cost, opportunity 
cost minus interest earned. The total inventory cost per unit is same as TBUC22a.
The vendor total cost consists of setup cost, inventory holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. 
The vendor total cost per unit time is same as TVUC22a.
Case 3.2.b.
wT K M/ >
1
 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory cost, opportunity 
cost minus interest earned. The total inventory cost per unit is same as TBUC22a. The vendor total cost 
consists of setup cost, physical inventory holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. The vendor 
total cost per unit time is same as TVUC22b.
Case 3.3.
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The vendor opportunity cost is equal with the vendor opportunity cost in case 2. The vendor interest 
earned is:
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The buyer interest cost is equal with the vendor interest earned and the buyer interest earned is equal 
with case 2.2.
Case 3.3.a.
wT K M/ <
1
 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory, opportunity cost 
minus interest earned. The total inventory cost per unit can be modeled as:
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The vendor total cost consists of setup cost, inventory holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. 
The vendor total cost can be formulated as:
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Case 3.3.b.
wT K M/ >
1
 
The buyer‘s total inventory cost consists of setup cost, transportation cost, inventory cost, opportunity 
cost minus interest earned. The total inventory cost per unit is same as TBUC33a. The vendor total cost 
consists of setup cost, physical inventory holding cost, interest cost minus interest earned. The vendor 
total cost can be formulated as:
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THE STACKELBERG GAME SOLUTION
In the Stackelberg game model, the buyer decision variables are replenishment period (T) and delivery 
frequency (K). The vendor offers the first and second delay of the payment period (M1 and M2). Since 
the model is complex, hybrid of Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) is 
applied. The GA method is used to solve leader optimization problem and PSO is applied to solve the 
follower optimization problem. In the solution we use a simple GA and PSO method. The GA method 
algorithm as below:
GA Algorithm
Chromosome
The chromosome (allele) is a binary The chromosome structure for 2 products is shown in Figure 5.
As example, the T in Figure 4 can be represented as:
T = 0x20+1x21+1x22+0x23 / 15 = 5/15 = 0.333 
and
Figure 5. Chromosome structure
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K = 0x20+1x21+0x22+1x23 = 9. 
Initial Population
The initial chromosome population is generated randomly and the population size is equal to 20.
Evaluation of Fitness
A fitness function is calculated using the total vendor unit cost if vendor act as the leader and the total 
buyer unit cost if the buyer act as the leader.
The Parent Selection
This model uses the roulette wheel method and a solution with a less fitness value has greater probability 
to be selected.
Genetic Operators
Genetic operators are used to derive a better solution for each generation. Genetic operators consist of 
elitism, crossover and mutation. In this study, the population size is set at a constant through successive 
generation. In each generation, elitism is set and crossover and mutation are used to generate new chil-
dren. Two point crossover function with crossover is used with probability is equal to 0.8. The mutation 
scheme is uniform with mutation probability is equal to 0.03.
Stopping Criterion
The stopping criterion for Genetic Algorithm depends on the number of generations. If the number of 
generations is greater than the value previously determined, then stop. We used 100 number of generations.
PSO Framework
Particle swarm optimization is a population-based computation technique where each particle moves 
according to its own best position and the best position of the other particle. It is like a flock of birds 
collectively foraging for food, where the food location is represented by the fitness function.
1.  Initialize particle by setting number of particles (pr), number of iterations (α) and some initial 
parameters. Set v
0
0

= , personal best (pbest) xl x
ps ps
   
=  and iteration i=1.
2.  For i=1,..., p decode x
ps
 
 to a set of decision variable.
3.  For i= 1..., p.calculate the performance measurement of Ri as Zi, where Zi is calculated using total 
vendor unit cost or total buyer unit cost depend on who acts as the follower. Update pbest by setting 
xl x
ps ps
   
=  if Z Z
x xlps ps
< .
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4.  Update gbest by setting xl x
ps ps
   
=  if Z Z
xl xgps s
<  Z Z
xl xgps s
< .
5.  Update the velocity and the position of each particle
v i w i v i u c i xg x i
ps ps s ps
       
+( )= ( )× ( )+  × ( )× −1 0 1 1, ( )( )+  × ( )× − ( )( )u c i xl x ips ps0 1 2,
   
 (20)
Update of the moment inertia using fitness distance ratio (FDR), and it can be can be shown as
w i w F
i F
F
w w F( ) = ( )+ −
−





 ( )− ( )( )1 1  (21)
Calculate the new position using (20)
x i x i v i
ps ps ps
     
+( )= ( )+ +( )1 1  (22)
6.  If the generation meet the stopping criteria, stop. Otherwise add generation by one and return to 
step 2.
7.  Set gbest of the last solution as the best solution for multi route inventory routing problem for 
deteriorating items.
A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
A numerical example is used to show how the model work and a sensitivity analysis is conducted to 
get management insights of the model. The numerical example use similar data as Goyal et al.(2007). 
The set of data that is used in this numerical example is [A,Av,Ie,c,pr,] = [200,150,4%,25,35,] and [P, D, 
Ct, hvo, h, hv] = [4000,1000,100,110,4,4]. In the first case, vendor acts as a leader and buyer acts as the 
follower. The decision variables have lower bound and upper bound as shown in Table 1.
The algorithm is run ten times to get a solution that near to the global optimal solution. The best solu-
tion with different values of Ic1 and Ic2 when vendor acts as a leader is shown in Table 2. Table 2 shows 
that the buyer cost tends to increase when the second period interest increase. Buyer tries to reduce her 
cost by reducing replenishment period and delivery frequency. In the other side, vendor tries to reduce 
as small as possible the first and second delay of payment to get more profit and reduce her total cost. 
Buyer’s and vendor’s total cost tend to be stable in varies the interest of the first delay of the payment 
period. The buyer’s and vendor’s decisions are not significantly different in varies interest of the first 
delay of payment.
In the second sensitivity analysis, buyer acts as a leader and vendor acts as a follower. The lower 
bound and upper bound of each decision are set as shown in Table 3.
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The calculation results with varies of interest rate at the first delay of the payment period (Ic1) and the 
second delay of the payment period (Ic2) are shown in Table 4. Table 4 shows the buyer’s and vendor’s 
decision is not sensitive in different Ic1 and Ic2. Since the buyer is the leader, vendor tries to minimize 
the inventory cost by set the first delay of payment to be 0 but the second delay of payment period have 
to be set as long as possible. When the buyer acts as a leader, the progressive payment scheme becomes 
a single delay of payment scheme.
Figure 6 shows the vendor and buyer total cost for varies of percentage interest rate of the first and 
second delay of payment. When vendor acts as a leader, total vendor cost (TVUC VL) decreases as 
the percentage rate of a second delay of payment increase and as a consequence, the buyer total cost 
increase. The condition is different when the buyer acts as a leader. The vendor total cost and the buyer 
total cost are not significantly different in value of the percentage rate of the second delay of payment. 
This condition shows that the total cost is more sensitive when the vendor acts as leader than the buyer 
acts as a leader. The comparison of the vendor total cost in varies of Ic1 and Ic2 can be seen in Figure 7.
Table 1. The decision variables bound
Decision Variables Upper Bound Lower Bound
M1 1,2 year 0 year
M2 1,2 year 0 year
K 20 times 1 times
T 1,3 year 0 year
Table 2. Sensitivity analysis with varies of Ic1 and Ic2 (vendor as a leader)
Ic1 Ic2 T* K* M1* M2* TVUC TBUC
3,5%
8% 0,5976 3 0,0025 0,1045 $1.355,20 $1.427,00
9% 0,4762 2 0,0007 0,0007 $1.324,20 $1.497,60
10% 0,4617 2 0,0002 0,0002 $1.294,30 $1.518,10
11% 0,4589 2 0,0003 0,0009 $1.268,20 $1.536,50
4%
8% 0,5983 3 0,0010 0,1230 $1.355,40 $1.426,40
9% 0,4764 2 0,0014 0,0015 $1.325,60 $1.496,80
10% 0,467 2 0,0001 0,0002 $1.294,20 $1.518,10
11% 0,4591 2 0,0011 0,0014 $1.269,30 $1.535,70
4,5%
8% 0,5974 3 0,0010 0,1340 $1.350,80 $1.430,10
9% 0,4761 2 0,0002 0,0002 $1.323,30 $1.498,20
10% 0,4672 2 0,0002 0,0009 $1.294,90 $1.517,50
11% 0,4588 2 0,0003 0,0004 $1.267,70 $1.536,90
5%
8% 0,5975 3 0,0030 0,1530 $1.351,50 $1.431,20
9% 0,4764 2 0,0012 0,0012 $1.325,00 $1.497,10
10% 0,4671 2 0,0004 0,0004 $1.294,60 $1.517,80
11% 0,4588 2 0,0005 0,0005 $1.267,80 $1.536,80
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Figure 7 shows that the vendor total cost is higher when vendor acts as a leader at small values of 
Ic1 and Ic2, but mostly the vendor total cost when vendor acts as a leader smaller than the buyer acts as 
a leader. Similar as previous research, vendor has bigger advantage when he acts as a leader than buyer 
acts as a leader. The difference of vendor total cost when vendor acts a leader and buyer acts a leader 
becomes wider as the percentage interest rate of the first delay of payment (Ic1) and percentage interest 
of the second delay of payment (Ic2) increase.
Figure 8 shows a comparison of buyer total cost when vendor acts as leader and buyer acts as a leader. 
In small first delay of payment interest rate (Ic1), the buyer total cost when buyer acts as a leader higher 
than vendor acts as a leader. The buyer total cost moves faster when vendor acts as leader and starts to 
become higher when Ic1 = 4% and Ic2 = 10% and 11%. The trends continue and the buyer total cost when 
vendor acts as a leader is higher than buyer acts as a leader in high first delay of payment interest rate 
(Ic1 = 5%). This situation shows that buyer has benefited even vendor acts as a leader when the vendor 
set small value of the first and second delay of payment interest rates.
Table 3. Lower bound and upper bound variables when buyer acts as a leader
Decision Variables Upper Bound Lower Bound
K 20 times 1 times
T 1,3 year 0 year
M1 1,2 year 0 year
M2 1,2 year 0 year
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis when buyer acts as a leader
Ic2 Ic1 T* K* M1* M2* TBUC TVUC
8%
3,50% 0,6956 3 0 1,2 $ 1.333,74 $ 1.571,60
4% 0,6638 3 0 1,2 $ 1.353,10 $ 1.506,80
4,50% 0,6464 3 0 1,2 $ 1.372,30 $ 1.464,70
5% 0,5995 3 0 1,2 $ 1.394,10 $ 1.388,70
9%
3,50% 0,6724 3 0 1,2 $ 1.333,20 $ 1.538,70
4% 0,6648 3 0 1,2 $ 1.353,10 $ 1.508,20
4,50% 0,6441 3 0 1,2 $ 1.372,40 $ 1.461,70
5% 0,5899 3 0 1,2 $ 1.396,20 $ 1.377,00
10%
3,50% 0,694 3 0 1,2 $ 1.333,60 $ 1.569,30
4% 0,6523 3 0 1,2 $ 1.353,30 $ 1.491,30
4,50% 0,643 3 0 1,2 $ 1372,40 $ 1460,30
5% 0,5997 3 0 1,2 $ 1394,10 $ 1388,90
11%
3,50% 0,7734 4 0 1,2 $ 1.349,40 $ 1.553,80
4% 0,665 3 0 1,2 $ 1.353,20 $ 1.508,50
4,50% 0,6472 3 0 1,2 $ 1.372,30 $ 1.465,70
5% 0,5962 3 0 1,2 $ 1.394,80 $ 1.384,70
211
Stackcelberg Game Inventory Model With Progressive Permissible Delay of Payment Scheme
 
Figure 6. Sensitivity analysis in varies of Ic1 and Ic2
Figure 7. Vendor total cost when vendor and buyer act as a leader
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The sensitivity analysis shows that the progressive payment scheme works as a single delay of pay-
ment when buyer acts as a leader and the decision variables and total cost are more stable. On the other 
side, when the vendor acts as leader, the decision variables and the total cost are sensitive in varies values 
of the first and second delay of payment interest rate. The sensitivity analysis shows that the progres-
sive payment scheme can be applied in the Stackelberg game model when vendor acts as the leader and 
vendor set small values of the first and second delay of payment interest rate.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, a Stackelberg game model for the progressive payment scheme is developed. The vendor 
offers to the buyer two delay of the payment period. When the buyer pays before the first delay of pay-
ment period, there is no interest charged by the vendor to the buyer. Interest is charged when a buyer 
pays after the first delay of the payment period and higher interest is charged when a buyer pays after the 
second delay of payments period. The model is solved using a hybrid of GA and PSO since the model is 
a nonlinear model. A numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis are conducted to show how the model 
works and gets some management insights. The sensitivity analysis shows that the progressive payment 
scheme is similar as a single payment scheme when the buyer acts as a leader. The vendor can get benefit 
when he acts as a leader, and the buyer can get benefit when he acts as a leader only when the first and 
second delay of payment interest rate offer by the vendor are high. The Stackelberg game model can 
work better when vendor acts as a leader and set small values of interest rates.
Figure 8. Buyer total cost when vendor act as a leader and buyer act as a leader
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